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Ideas and Interests:
Businessmen and the Interstate Commerce Act
EDWARD

A.

PURCELL, JR.

HISTORIANS have generally seen the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
as the first major step on the road to federal regulation of business. While
much of the rhetoric of American politics painted the issue in terms of ''the
people" or "the farmers" against "business," scholars have long been
aware of the inadequacy of that view. Rather than opposing all government
regulation, businessmen were often involved in sponsoring and supporting
such legislation. Within the last two decades historians have published several important studies concerning the origin and purpose of the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887. Lee Benson, studying the New York State movement toward regulation of the roads, was able to delineate the impact of
railroad development on various economic interest groups in the state and
explain the conflict generated among them. He focused mainly on merchants, especially those in New York City, and their fight for more favorable freight rates. "New York merchants," he concluded, "constituted the
single most important group behind the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act.'' 1
More recently, Gabriel Kolko finished an examination of federal regulation from 1877 to 1916, which concentrated on the machinations and motives of railroad leaders. The railroads were ruining themselves by cutthroat competition, Kolko argued; and hence they actually sought government regulation to stabilize their industry and to make it more profitable.
He amply demonstrated that many railroad men both accepted the premise
of federal regulation and strongly supported certain proposed laws. Although railroad managers were obviously not alone in urging federal action
and often disagreed among themselves, Kolko maintained that ttthe railThis article received the OAH's Pelzer Award for 1967. Mr. Purcell is assistant professor
of speech in the University of California, Berkeley.
1
lee Benson, Merchants, Farmers, & Railroads: Railroad Regulation and New Y 01'k
Politics, 1850-1887 (Cambridge, 1955), 212.
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roads, not the farmers and shippers, were the most important single advocates of federal regulation from 1877 to 1916." 2
It was t<businessmen" and not ttthe people" or ttfarmers" who were the
most important advocates of federal regulation, Benson and Kolko agreed;
but, of course, they disagreed over which businessmen were most important.
Other historians, examining the role of businessmen in the nineteenth century, have generally concurred that economic changes caused by the growth
of rail transportation forced various groups to support federal regulation. 8
A study of the relationship between the competitive economy of the latenineteenth century and the ideas of American businessmen would clarify
the attitude of various groups toward government regulation as well as
suggest more accurately the meaning and importance of the Interstate Commerce Act. Obviously, nonbusiness groups endorsed and influenced legislation for their own motives; but the purpose here is to examine only the
reaction of American businessmen to the railroad problem and to relate
their responses to the complexity of the economic system in which they
were caught.
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, American businessmen
operated in an impersonal economic structure. In order to meet their competition, individuals whose businesses depended on shipping goods had to
control as much as possible their major transportation connections. The
rapid and far-reaching railroad system, which had developed after the Civil
War, altered older economic relationships and placed many businessmen at
a competitive disadvantage. The railroads, for example, diverted much
trade from the water routes that followed the Great Lakes and the Erie
Canal, and deprived merchants along the waterway of much of the business they had previously en joyed. 4 In addition to disrupting trade channels,
the roads offered cheap, long-haul transportation that enabled distant merchants to compete with smaller businessmen who had earlier been able to
control their local markets. Flour millers in St. Louis and Chicago, for instance, took advantage of low through-rates in order to compete for southern markets. Millers in Nashville, a local center, lost much of their market,
2

Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916 (Princeton, 1965), 3.
See below, and especially Edward Chase Kirkland, Men, Cities and Transportation: A
Study in New England History, 1820-1900 (2 vols., Cambridge, 1948), I, 496, 503-04,
507-08, 514, 517, 523; Charles N. Glaab, Kansas City and the Railroads: Community Policy
in the Growth of a Regional Metropolis (Madison, 1962), chapters I and II, and 174-75,
189-92; Gerald D. Nash, "Origins of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887," Pennsylvania
History, XXIV (July 1957), 181-90.
4
Benson, Merchants, Farmers, and Railroads, 30-36; Frederick Merk, "Eastern Antecedents of the Grangers," Agricultural History, 23 (Jan. 1949), 1; Weekly Northwestern
Miller, 21 (April 9, 1886), 350; Edward C. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age: Business,
Labor, and Public Policy, 1860-1897 (New York, 1961), 98.
3
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including Atlanta, a traditional customer, and suffered greatly as a result. 5
Moreover, the complicated rate structures worked new hardships on many
individuals and areas. The grain merchants of Pittsburgh lost much of their
trade when the railroads began charging ten cents per hundred pounds
more for grain from Chicago to Pittsburgh than they did on the much
longer haul from Chicago to New York. Later, both the Pittsburgh Chamber
of Commerce and the Grain and Flour Exchange heartily endorsed the Interstate Commerce Act, including the controversial long-and-short-haul
clause. 6
Businessmen recognized the importance of the railroads, and those who
were not in a position to influence railroad policy but who depended on
railroad service, feared and resented the rate discriminations and the power
that characterized the transportation system. Even Poor's Manual, a staunch
advocate of both railroad practices and interests, admitted that the charge
of discrimination was the major complaint made in all quarters against the
roads. 7 When the developing railroad system added the threat of potentialw
ly ruinous rate differentials to the already highly competitive and dynamic
economy, those businessmen who were unable to take advantage of such
differentials began to consider the desirability of government regulation.
That truth was further substantiated when the biggest shippers, who could
command rebates and profit from the differentials, were almost alone in
opposing government regulation. 8
The widespread support for federal legislation did not mean, however,
that most businessmen agreed on the specific type of law that was needed.
Frank J. Firth, president of the Erie and Western Transportation Company, implicitly recognized the diversity and conflict among businessmen
when he testified before Senator Shelby M. Cullom's committee investigating interstate commerce in 1885. Firth attempted to defend the roads
and at the same time place them in a position superior to their many antagonists. "The transporter or merchant appearing before you," he politely
told the senators, nspeaks from the narrow field of observation within
which this modern science of division of labor has confined him. " 9 Since
each businessman saw only the one aspect that influenced his own business,
Firth argued, then such a man could not give a comprehensive analysis.
Firth's obvious conclusion was that the Cullom committee should not listen
5

House Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 17 61), 51.
Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age, 98; Cong. Record, 49 Cong., 2 Sess., 385 (Jan. 5,
1887).
7
Henry V. Poor, Manual of the Railroads of the United States for 1882 (New York,
1882), ix.
8
Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 34.
9
Senate Reports, 49 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 46, ·Part II (Serial 2357), 464.
r.
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to complaining merchants but should rely instead on railroad men-those
who understood the whole situation and knew all of the facts necessary to
formulate an interstate commerce law.
Spokesmen for those businessmen who feared rate discrimination dis~
agreed wholeheartedly with Firth and espoused their own brand of federal
railroad regulation. Not all of them were enthusiastic about government
interference, but their experience told them it was necessary. William H.
Beebe, a member of a Chicago merchant firm, represented those diverse
shipping groups when he addressed the Cullom committee. ttWhile I do
not lean very much toward paternal legislation on the part of the Government," he explained, "still I am decidedly of the opinion that when the
railroads begin to touch the point of discrimination, regulation by a commission or by some other governmental agency would be beneficial.'' 10
The question of discrimination was puzzling and complex. Railroad men
and shippers engaged in and suffered from various planned and purposeful
discriminations. The whole transportation system also almost unavoidably
resulted in widespread inequalities, which were themselves unintentional
and accidental. Geographical location, size of shipments, competition from
other transportation systems, and varying railroad overhead all combined to
make uniform rates an impossible goal. The new railroad network pulled
local merchants inextricably into a complex web of trade patterns, forcing
them to compete with distant rivals. Trade areas overlapped more and
more until a dozen cities could serve one section of the country that had
previously relied on one local center. 11 Individuals throughout the nation
whose business depended on the shipment of goods had to have favorable
transportation costs, not just for growth and profits, but for survival.
The foundation of the transportation system lay in the five great trunk
lines that tied the East to the West and Midwest and dominated the transportation of goods in intersectional and international trade. Each directly
connected the trans-Appalachian region with one or more of the major
eastern seaports: Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. The
merchants in these cities engaged in a constant struggle with one another to
protect and increase their share of the western trade, just as the trunk lines
fought with one another over the available freight. Thus, in 1881, the New
10

Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 653.
House Exec. Docs., 48 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 7, Part II (Serial 2294), 8; Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age, 51, 66-68, 78, 98, 100, 126-27; House Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess.,
No. 46, Part II (Serial 1761), 49; House Exec. Docs., 46 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 7, Part II
(Serial 1966), 8-10. For the fight between various localities for railroad connections see
Carter Goodrich, Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890
(New York, 1960), 234, 237, 259-61, 282-83; Earl S. Beard, "Local Aid to Railroads in
Iowa," Iowa Journal of History, 50 (Jan. 1952), 1-34.
11
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York Central cut its rates in an attempt to increase its freight and to win
more trade for New York. The other trunk lines responded with similar
cuts, and soon rate war followed. Businessmen in the four cities entered the
fight immediately because they feared that their competitors would secure
more favorable differentials. 12 Both the railroads and the ports tried to
work out agreements on differentials in the interest of peace and steady
profits, but their failure led to constant dissatisfaction and rate-cutting.
Conflicts even divided the interests of the trunk lines from those of their
original terminals. The various roads found it profitable to carry goods to
rival cities, and the merchants of the terminal cities took advantage of
cheaper rates from other lines.18
Edward Kemble, a Boston merchant, was typical of the businessmen who
needed low rail rates. When the rates were temporarily disadvantageous,
he called for government regulation to improve his competitive position.
"Massachusetts and a good portion of New England are, in my judgment,
to-day laboring under an outrageous railroad discrimination," he daimed. 14
The railroads were favoring New York with relatively cheap rates, Kemble
argued, and they were thus robbing Boston of her share of the trade. Earlier, when the differentials weighed against New York, the city's Chamber
of Commerce had petitioned Congress for relief from the unjust discriminations that were injuring ttthe producing, commercial, and other interests
of the state, and particularly those of the City of New York." 10 Railroad
executives, too, disliked the open competition and despaired at the continual and debilitating rate wars. Even Albert Fink, the staunch supporter of
private pooling, came to believe that only federal legislation could establish
a viable pooling system. 16
Competition among producers and shippers in the Midwest and the
South was as sharp and unrelenting as it was in the East. Chicago and St.
Louis, the major centers in the Midwest, had a long history of commercial
rivalry that the advent of railroad transportation only intensified. 11 They
were challenged, however, by an increasing number of regional competitors
12

Benson, Merchants 1 Farmers, and Railroads, 29-79; Kirkland, Men, Cities, and Transportation, I, 502-08, 512-16.
13
House Exec. Docs., 45 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 32, Part III (Serial 1857), 146.
u Senate Reports, 49 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 2357), 379.
13
Henry V. Poor, Manual of the Railroads of the United States, 1881 (New York, 1881),

m.

16
House Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 1761), 12; D. T. Gilchrist, "Albert Fink and the Pooling System," Business History Review, 34 (Spring 1960),
38; Thomas C. Cochran, Railroad Leaders, 1845-1890: The Business Mind in Action (Cambridge, 1953), 161-62, 165, 192.
11
Wyatt Winton Belcher, The Economic Rivalry Between St. Louis and Chicago, 18501880 (New York, 1947), especially chapters IV, V, IX, X.
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which were anxious about their own share of the growing commerce. Kansas
City, Louisville, Cincinnati, New Orleans, Peoria, and many other cities
struggled for prominent places in the burgeoning commerce of the Midwest. Under the influence of shippers in Minneapolis and St. Paul, for example, the Chicago, Burlington & Northern lowered rates to improve the
competitive position of the Twin Cities against Chicago and St. Louis. 18
After 1876, merchants in Milwaukee, enjoying a rate differential over competitors in Chicago, cut into their business until the latter were able to command equal rates. 19
One of the most spectacular examples of the expansion of competition
created by railway growth centered on the lucrative trade which St. Louis
enjoyed in Latin American products--especially sugar, molasses, crockery,
and coffee-that were shipped through New Orleans and up the Mississippi, the shortest trade route from the South. Chicago businessmen
challenged the merchants of New Orleans and St. Louis by allying with importers in Baltimore and winning the support of the trunk lines seeking
additional westbound freight. Utilizing freight reductions from Baltimore
of up to ninety percent, Chicago merchants were able to offer lower delivery prices on goods from Latin America and to divert the trade from New
Orleans and the Mississippi route, thus profiting themselves, the trunk lines,
and the Baltimore importers. 20
Businessmen in smaller cities and interior distribution points refused to
accept, without putting up a strong fight, the loss of trade and influence
that the expansion of competition caused. They supported both state and
federal regulation as a means of preserving their economic positions. The
businessmen in Dubuque, Iowa, and other river towns led the fight for
state regulation to protect themselves from roads offering low through-rates
to Chicago. They received support in the interior, not so much from the
Grangers but from the small businessmen in the prairie towns who also
suffered from rate discriminations. Together they were able to pass the famous Iowa Granger law, bringing the roads under state control. 21 In 1877,
when the railroads imposed a temporary embargo on the city's grain, the
Kansas City Times vigorously attacked the move as ''a vital stab at the business interests of the city." Earlier the f ournal of Commerce, a local business publication, had urged a federal antipooling law to protect local
13

Weekly Northwestern Miller, 22 (Aug. 27, 1886), 204.
House Exec. Docs., 44 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 1761), 51-52.
20
Ibid., 52-5 3.
21
George H. Miller, "Origins of the Iowa Granger Law," Mississippi Valley Historical
Review, XL (March 1954), 658-59, 664, 668, 678-80.
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interests. 22 Merchants in Montgomery, Selma, and Mobile joined forces in
1881 to establish Alabama's first railroad commission, which they hoped
would protect their endangered commercial positions from the consolidation of local roads under the control of the Louisville and Nashville. 23
Braxton Bragg Comer, who later led the movement for further state regulation in Alabama, was himself a victim of the expansion of competition.
Rivals in St. Louis and other northern centers had ruined his Birmingham
milling trade and forced him out of business. 24
Discriminatory railroad practices existed not only between competing
businessmen in different regions but also between merchants in the same
city or area. In New York the Chamber of Commerce opposed two key
provisions of the proposed Interstate Commerce Act, while the members of
the Board of Trade and Transportation supported them both. 25 The result
of the situation, declared the president of the New York Produce Exchange, had been to aid certain favored merchants, who were often large
stockholders in the roads, to the detriment of their local competitors. 26 Such
practices caused great damage to the helpless merchants, he believed, and
were wholly unjust. Perhaps there is no stronger motivation than the combination of a feeling of injustice with the fear of unpro.fitability. A Chicago
businessman stated it clearly: "It is simply in effect letting one man steal
another man's business.'' 21
Rate policies often divided local businessmen in different lines of commerce. In Boston, for example, where most merchants who dealt in goods
shipped by rail were angry about differentials made in favor of New York
and other cities, the exporting merchants stood strongly in favor of the existing rates. William H. Lincoln, manager of a Boston steamship line, explained that his export trade had grown immensely after the railroads
began shipping large quantities of goods from the West. Since the roads
had cut the rate from Chicago to Boston on goods intended for export,
Boston had gained an advantage over New York in the export trade. 28
Kemble, acknowledging that exporters bene.fitted from existing rates, declared that the majority of Boston businessmen were not helped by the
22

Glaab, Kansas City and the Railroads, 176, 177.
James F. Doster, Alabama's Fit'st Railroad Commission, 1881-1885 (University, Ala.,
1949), 30-31, 34-35, 180; James F. Doster, Railroads in Alabama Politics, 1875-1914
(University, Ala., 1957), 8, 20-24.
2
' James F. Doster, "The Conflict over Railroad Regulation in Alabama," Business History Review, 28 (Dec. 1954), 3 38.
25
Cong. Record, 49 Cong., 2 Sess., 477, 791 (Jan. 10, 18, 1887).
~ Senate Reports, 49 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 2357), 214.
27
Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 592.
28
Ibid., Part II (Serial 2,357)~ 354.
23
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rates. tllt is of no benefit to her merchants," he broadly declared, uit is of
no benefit to her banks, it is of no benefit to her insurance companies, it is
of no benefit to her real-estate interests." 29
Again, at other times, rate differentials divided the interests of those in the
same business. From the standpoint of the origin of the Interstate Commerce Act, one of the most important local conflicts existed in western
Pennsylvania between the Rockefeller forces and the competing independent oil producers. Through the ability to command exorbitant rebates
from the railroads, Rockefeller was slowly forcing his rivals out of business. In self-defense the independents joined to bring pressure on their
congressman for government regulation of the railroads, especially for an
antirebate law. Their campaign led directly to the introduction of John H.
Reagan's bill into the House of Representatives in 1878. 80 While that bill
eventually became the basic House bill and was in large part made law in
1887, it came too late for the independent oil producers who had surrendered to Rockefeller by 1880.
Other business groups throughout the country joined the attack on discriminatory railroad practices. Merchants handling dairy goods in the northcentral states complained because they were charged much higher rates on
butter and cheese than the merchants shipping meats or lard had to pay. 81
There seemed to be no defense against such injustices, they argued, and they
called for federal action to end them. Steamboat operators also objected to
the railroad practice of cutting rates to the bare minimum when competing
with water lines. The railroads could make up their losses on noncompetitive lines; the steamships could not. By such methods, explained J. B.
Wood, an agent of the St. Louis and New Orleans Anchor Line, railroads
tried to ruin the steamship lines. 32 Even those men engaged in the jewelry
trade were critical of the railroads and wanted some type of regulation.
The roads generally did not want to bother with the small but valuable
jewelry trunks and made it very difficult for the jewelers to transport their
goods. 33 That was unfair, the jewelers argued; they were willing to assume
the risk for their goods, if they could only get the reasonable transportation
services that the roads had previously refused them.
The new system of railroad transportation not only established a wider
sphere of competition and made advantageous freight rates a major factor in
211

Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 382. See also Cong. Record, 49 Cong., 2 Sess., 634-35
(Jan. ;4, 1887).
30
Nash, "Origins of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887," 181-84, 189.
31
Senate Reports, 49 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 2357), 657.
32
Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 1398.
33
Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 446.
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commercial success but also fragmented the interests of American businessmen. Gradually, businessmen made alliances on the basis of their attitude toward government regulation of the railroads, each operating from
his own motives and for his own interests. The struggle over the role gov·
ernment should play in the railroad system divided businessmen into four
main groups. The largest of them, composed of the men who suffered from
unfavorable differentials, strongly urged government action to protect their
interests or, as they phrased it, to insure the public welfare. "In our judgment the time has arrived," read a statement of the Toledo Produce Exchange, ''when Congress should assume its undoubted right and duty to the
whole of the country, to supervise the whole system of transportation in
this country." 34 The Peoria Board of Trade was even more specific: "The
best method of preventing extortion and discrimination," it declared, "is
by means of stringent laws passed by Congress.,, 35
Often businessmen who favored strong legislation to control interstate
commerce revealed marked antipathy to the railroads. Eastern merchants
shared much the same attitude traditionally associated with midwestern
farmers. The railroads "have come to the conclusion apparently that they
are masters of the situation,,, charged James H. Seymour, representing the
New York Mercantile Exchange, "and they treat it as if it was a business
of their own, a private business, not a public business, and do not seem to
regard themselves as doing business for the public." 36 James Spear, a Philadelphia manufacturer, took another tack, striking at an obvious failing of
the roads. "My complaint;• he stated, ttwould be simply a general complaint of bad management of all the railroads in the United States .... " 37
The great majority of the businessmen who favored government regulation gave wholehearted support to the idea of a watchdog commission that
would be empowered to prohibit unfair railroad practices. In large part,
general confidence in the commission system stemmed from relatively successful experiences, especially in Massachusetts, during the previous decade.
"It seems reasonable," remarked J. D. Seeberger, a wholesale hardware
dealer in Des Moines, Iowa, referring to the commission plan, ''that, according to the working of the commission in this State, it might operate successfully in an enlarged sphere." 38 Businessmen wanted effective regulation,
not some untried experiment. They felt that the commission system had
proved itself, and they were willing to support it.
34

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
36
Ibid.,
37
Ibid.,
38
Ibid.,
35

Part I (Serial 2356), appendix, 71
Part I (Serial 2356), appendix, 103.
Part II (Serial 2357), 207.
Part II (Serial 2357), 473
Part II (Serial 2357), 986

570

The Journal of American History

Many businessmen disagreed about the exact amount of control that the
commission should exercise; yet they wanted it to have enough authority to
be effective. Many suggested that either the commission be given judicial
powers to decide law suits brought against the roads or have its findings
made prima facie evidence in any court of law in the nation. Few would
have gone along with M. A. Fulton, a Wisconsin merchant, who urged that
Congress should pass an ttabsolute law" which would establish rates
throughout the country. 39 Such a plan was much too rigid.
A second, smaller group of businessmen took a more cautious approach.
Their economic positions demanded some type of government regulation,
but they were unsure as to both the type of legislation needed and all the
ramifications of such action. t'My opinion is that Congress should go pretty
slow upon the subject of regulating, or attempting to regulate, freight
rates," declared E. 0. Stanard, a St. Louis mill owner, 'tespecially at this
time, when everything is so depressed." 4 ° Charles Ridgely, president of the
Springfield Iron Company, expressed the same concern that government
action might harm business activity in general. ''Less damage to business is
likely to occur from doing too little in the way of regulation of interstate
commerce than from doing to much," he told the Cullom committee.41
Still, under the circumstances, both men acknowledged the need for federal regulation.
In spite of their fear that regulation might cause further econo~ic hardships and an inbred suspicion of government interference, many businessmen allowed economic necessity to overcome most of their doubts. Bradstreet's best represented many of the businessmen in that group; and although the magazine did not support the Cullom bill, it did concede that
ttWith this demand for the passage of a national law, there exists a general
acquiescence even on the part of railroad men themselves in the principles
of a national railroad commission.•' 42
A third group, much smaller than the first two, formed around those men
-predominantly railroad men and investors in weaker railroad bonds-who
advocated government regulation not for the protection of the public but
for the welfare of the struggling roads. James D. Furber, the manager of
the Boston and Maine Railroad, asked Congress for a law prohibiting rebates. "They are very annoying in your accounts and annoying to the railroads," he explained; "there is nothing fair about it to the public or to the
39

Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 1248.
Ibid., Part II (Serial 2357), 852.
41
Ibid., Part I (Serial 2356), appendix, 65.
42
Bradstreet's: A Journal of Trade, Finance and Public Economy, XV (Jan. 15, 1887),
52. See also ibid., XV (Feb. 5, 1887), 98
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railway .... " 43 W. G. Raoul, president of the Central Railroad and Banking Company of Georgia, went even further by suggesting that Congress
should pass laws to insure fairer profits for the railroads and a just return
on capital investments. 44 Furber and Raoul drew support from such railroad presidents as John King of the Erie, J. C. Clarke of the Illinois Central, Frank S. Bond of the Reading, and George B. Roberts of the Pennsylvania, all of whom favored federal regulation that would aid the lines
suffering from overexpansion and rate wars. 45
The major railroad journals gave voice to the same demands and the
same goals. They defended the roads as essential to the well-being of the
American economy and argued that they deserved to be protected from
harmful legislation. The Railway World declared that the roads had ((rendered an immense amount of service to the American people, and done more
than any other single agency to generate national prosperity." 46 Not content
with such self-praise, the Railway Age insisted that: "The vast interests
represented in and connected with the operation of railways are entitled not
only to protection from injustice but to friendly fostering by the
government." 47 The other journals took similar stands, admitting both the
right and need for federal action, but contended that the legislation should
help rather than hinder the railroads. 48
Although Chauncey M. Depew of the New York Central had declared
that ''all the leading railroad men, I think, admit the principle of government supervision and are anxious for it," railroad men clearly disagreed
with the type of legislation that most other businessmen had in mind. 49 The
economic structure of late nineteenth-century America forced railroad men,
as it had forced other businessmen, to seek the protection of the federal
government. 50
A fourth distinct group of businessmen rejected the idea of federal regu·
lation of the railroads and were driven by two entirely different motives.
One such group of men opposed railroad regulation because they thought
that any such legislation would only aid the railroads to the detriment of
43

Senate Reports, 49 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 46, Part II (Serial 2357), 333.
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everyone else. Regulation in their minds was actually a crutch for the roads.
Francis B. Thurber, a New York wholesale grocer who had long been interested in the problems of transportation, spoke for this group when he
told the Cullom committee that the railroads were the chief supporters of
federal regulation: ttThe trouble is, with many railroad men who have
failed in the tasks required of them, to pay dividends on the capitalization,
that they want now to appeal to the Government to help them out.'' 51 He
advised them to stay with the doctrine of competition, even though it might
work temporary hardship on some people. A similar view was expressed by
J. H. Walker, a Massachusetts manufacturer, who stated that ugreat injury
. . . would be done to the country by any effort to protect the owners of the
railroads." 52 Although they overestimated by far the number of railroad
men who favored the final Interstate Commerce Act, Thurber and Walker
were well aware of the attempt made by railroad men to secure the passage
of a favorable regulatory law.
The other group that opposed government regulation argued from both
practical and theoretical bases; they combined the plea that the complexities
of railroad management were beyond the competence of legislation with
their adherence to principles of laissez faire and free enterprise. Although
the members of that group may have believed firmly in their laissez-faire
principles, they were also usually individuals who prospered under the status quo-either spokesmen for companies that enjoyed profitable rate
differentials or owners of high-dividend railroad stocks. Charles A. Pillsbury,
one of the major and most successful shippers in the nation as well as
one who commanded lucrative rebates, was a perfect example. uwe have
no complaints to make," he truthfully informed the committee. 53
Charles E. Perkins, president of the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy
Railroad, was the most outspoken member of that small but determined
group. Not only did he refuse to admit the existence of any but the rarest
case of railroad abuse but also he attacked just about every proposal of regulation that had been suggested. He denounced the plan of publicized railroad rates, denied the possible efficacy of any scheme of rate-fixing, attacked uniform accounting laws, justified pools and price discriminations,
and rejected the idea of annual railroad reports to the government. 54
"The wisdom of any legislation which may look to changing the conditions which have produced results on the whole so beneficial," he
confidently stated, ctmay well be doubted." The real evil, he suggested, was
51
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that an erroneous public opm1on might force the passage of laws that
would seriously harm the whole economic structure of the nation and very
likely lead to complete government ownership of the railroads. ((Among
the evils of Government ownership and control," he predicted, "would undoubtedly be higher charges and increased taxation." 55 Perkins' resentment
against the Interstate Commerce Act died hard. Two years after its passage,
in a pamphlet published by the C. B. & Q., he called the law unwise, impractical, and one of the greatest burdens under which the roads had to
operate. 56
Perkins had one prominent counterpart. The Commercial and Financial
Chronicle led a determined opposition against government regulation and
defended a strict version of laissez faire. In 1874, commenting on the business recession, it had noted:
trade is suffering from those general sources of commercial disturbance which
have been often demonstrated to be as far beyond the reach of human legislation as are the meterological [sic] forces that bring about a late spring or a wet
summer, or a copious harvest. As the world grows wiser men are getting to recognize more and more the marvellous wisdom of the great doctrine of the
French economists, "laissez-/aire et laissez-passer." 51

Following its guiding principle, the Chronicle continually attacked the idea
of government regulation of the railroads. HHardly anything can be more
dangerous just now than any further extension of Congressional power," it
declared in 1879; and two years later, it noted that federal regulation t'can be
anything but a failure we have but the slightest expectation." 58 When Congress was preparing the final version of the Interstate Commerce Act in
1886, the Chronicle angrily insisted that "The measure as proposed is so
full of crudities and so totally at variance with all economic and we might
almost say moral laws that it passes comprehension how an intelligent body
of men can countenance or recommend certain of its provisions.'' 59
In spite of the air of certainty and authority that marked its pages, the
Chronicle represented only a small minority of the businessmen concerned
with interstate transportation. Few American businessmen shared the journal's belief in the benevolent workings of laissez-faire economics, at least
in regard to the problem of the railroads. They were much more interested
in operating their businesses more efficiently and profitably. Most business
groups saw government regulation as a necessary means to that end.
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Businessmen showed little interest in philosophical distinctions. The great
majority of them rejected laissez-faire economics and cared little for the
theory of the survival of the fittest, often considered the basis of business
philosophy. Hardly anyone who testified before the Cullom committee even
mentioned the concept. Businessmen were much more concerned with the
evils of rate discrimination, the effects of pooling, and the value of longand-short-haul legislation than they were with the laws of nature, the
benevolence of competition, or the loss of an abstract liberty. The very few
men who even made reference to the concept clearly rejected it. John H.
Devereux, the president of the Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati, & Indianapolis Railroad, who claimed that nabsolutely the railroad interests of this
country are going to destruction,'' believed that regulation was necessary for
the good of the roads. 60 The chaos in the railway industry was "not to be
remedied by waiting upon 'the survival of the fittest.' " That ((misapplied
phrase" had nothing to do with the condition of the railroads, Devereux explained, and was of no help in attempting to improve the situation. t(The
law of tsurvival' may apply to animals," he emphasized, ttbut not to rail·
roads .... " 61 George W. Parker, vice president and general manager of the
St. Louis, Alton, & Terre Haute Railroad, expressed the same pragmatic attitude when he said simply that ttthe theory of the tsurvival of the fittest' does
not apply to railroads .... " 62 Parker, like Devereux, accepted the necessity
of regulation and urged pooling as the solution to railroad conflict. Even
Poor' s Manual, which complained of the difficulties that afflicted the roads
in 188 5, declared firmly that the theory of survival did not work in the
railroad business. ttRailroads," the editors argued, "unfortunately, seem to
reverse the rule of 'the survival of the fittest,' to 'the survival of the
unfittest.' " 68
Businessmen were thus more interested in solving particular problems
than they were in adhering to any "business philosophy." Perhaps on a
different issue they might have appealed to the theory of survival of the
fittest or to the principles of free competition, but when it was clearly contrary to their interests they readily abandoned both of them. 64 There could
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be no question that the vast majority of them viewed some type of government action as a necessity for their economic welfare.
When Congress was seriously debating the interstate commerce bill in
188 5 and 1886, businessmen throughout the nation supported the idea of
regulation in overwhelming numbers. During the first session of the Fortyninth Congress petitions from business groups were almost unanimous in
favoring federal action. 65 Criticism grew only after the Senate-House conference had worked out a final proposal. Then, businessmen who would
have been harmed by the specific type of regulation Congress had accepted
protested against the offending provisions in the bill, especially against the
antipooling and long-and-short-haul clauses. 66 Since those merchants located close to markets favored the long-and-short-haul clause, most opposition to that provision came from shippers in western cities such as Chicago
and Springfield. 67 These opponents of the interstate commerce bill did not
attack the idea of regulation; they complained only that certain parts of the
bill would be harmful to their economic positions. Regulation would be
fine, they argued, so long as it was tthelpful" regulation.
The opposing reactions of millers in St. Louis and Minneapolis, rivals in
the flour trade, were typical of the reactions among competing businessmen
across the nation. Since Minneapolis had a great advantage over St. Louis
before l 8S7, due to the availability of cheap water transportation and the
ability of her millers to force large rebates from the competing roads, Minneapolis flour merchants were unanimous in attacking the conference billsaving special condemnation for the long-and-short-haul clauses. 68 St. Louis
merchants, however, hoping that the new provisions would enable them to
compete more favorably with the northern center, favored the bill and expected it to accomplish "a great deal of good." The Weekly Northwestern
Miller, a journal of the Minneapolis milling interests, frankly summarized
the opposing reactions by observing that the interests of the two cities
seemed ''diametrically opposed.'' The editors were not surprised that most
St. Louis businessmen supported the bill. 69
Although many railroad men had supported legislation favorable to the
roads, most of them agreed that the interstate commerce bill was not the
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law they had wanted. Although Kolko' s assertion that railroad men agreed
to the principle of federal regulation is undoubtedly true, his conclusion
that the roads favored the final bill and for the mqst part ttwelcomed the
signing of the new railroad law'' is quite doubtful. 7° Kolko himself admits
that John Murray Forbes and William Bliss, two leading railroad men,
were hostile to the new act. They were not alone. The presidents of most
roads were dissatisfied with the House-Senate compromise bill and worked
against its passage. They focused their opposition on Congress, bringing
special pressure to bear on their senators and representatives. The presidents of all five of the Vanderbilt lines opposed the bill throughout 1887
and into 1888.71 Jay Gould and Leland Stanford denounced it. Samuel
Sloan, president of the Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western, claimed that
ttThe bill is impracticable and ought not to pass," while Clement A. Griscom, a director of the Pennsylvania, thought that there had already been
too much legislation. 72 tlThe Inter-State Commerce Bill ... ,"wrote Frederick J. Kimball, president of the Norfolk and Western, "will, I think, break
up the entire through transportation business of the country and will work
great harm to all business interests.'' 78
Moreover, the actual positions of the major railroad journals ranged
from general dissatisfaction to bitter hostility. The Railroad Gazette,
the least antagonistic of the major industry journals, tended to accept
the new law but still did not like it and declared that ''it hamp~rs business
as badly as a much severer law" and could do tta great deal of harm." 74
Although that journal claimed that the new law could be the basis for
something better, its whole argument was that only if the roads obeyed the
law could they show both the legislators and the public how bad it actually
was, and hence bring about ttsomething better ." 75
The Railway Review, which showed much less restraint in its attack on
the new law, stated that it was passed ''by the votes of men who do not believe in it," because tttheir votes were forced from them by popular clamor." Referring to charges made during debate on the bill, the Review
agreed that members of Congress udid not like the law" and that the bill
was one nthat nobody understood, that nobody wanted." 76 It also charged
that ttThe bill, as it now stands, places too great, too autocratic power in
the hands of five men, and subjects them to too severe temptations." It was
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ttunwise and unjust." The Review went far beyond the attacks of the other
industry journals. ''In fact, if the act had been devised by the enemies of
the government and of the people of the United States," it declared on
January 22, 1887, nthe most merciless malice and the most careful deliberation could hardly have hit upon a measure more deadly and far-reaching
in its effects." 77
The other leading industry journals also expressed grave doubts and
deep fears over the proposed measure. The Reagan-Cullom bill t'will seriously jeopardize the efficiency of numerous links of the existing through
railway systems," declared the Railway World. ((That any important movement in such a direction will be a serious error can scarcely be doubted."
The mainspring for much of the regulatory legislation, the World asserted,
''seems to be furnished by a supposition that plans can be devised whereby
the nation can be enriched by impoverishing the railways." "This is sorry
work for an American congress," the JVorld concluded. 78 ''The injurious
effects of the interstate commerce law ought to cause serious reflection on
the part of the makers and supporters of this law," declared the Railway
Age, which continued to oppose the act into 1888 and 1889. 79 "The law
has put a premium on reckless competition and incited all kinds of sharp
practices" in the competitive railroad industry. ''The utter heartlessness of
the law" marked it off from all other regulatory attempts. ttin some of its
features the interstate commerce law defies the natural principle of justice
and equity, and hence it cannot endure without reform." 80 Even the commission which was supposed to interpret the law ttconservatively" drew
the scorn of that journal. The members "seem to have moved with the current of popular opinion into the feeling that the interstate commerce law
was intended solely for the repression and punishment of the railway interest," the Railway Age complained bitterly, "and not to any degree for its
protection."f' 1
Thus there was widespread and vocal opposition to the Interstate Commerce Act on the part of many railroad executives. That they generally
welcomed the bill appears doubtful. Granted, some railroad managers-for
various reasons-did either support or accept the act. The point is that
there was strong and determined opposition and much division of opinion.
Railroad men were neither satisfied with the bill generally nor were they its
strongest supporters. Very likely the great division of opinion among the
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roads gave other interests a greater weight than they might otherwise have
had against a united railroad lobby.
Just as the railroads were not the major advocates behind the Interstate
Commerce Act, neither were the New York merchants nor any other single
group. Support for government regulation was, in fact, widespread among
businessmen; and that near unanimity was more important in forcing federal action than was the endorsement by any one group. The primary dynamism behind the drive for regulation was the threatening pattern of economic changes that forced most businessmen in all lines of commerce to
seek federal intervention as a means of protecting their own individual interests. The desire for economic protection was the one and only unifying
force among those who supported regulation; and it cut across all commercial and geographic boundaries and swept up the great majority of American businessmen into an effective movement for the assertion of their interests through the federal government.
It was neither ((the people'' nor ttthe farmers"-nor even ''the businessmen''-who were responsible for the government regulation of railroads.
Rather, it was many diverse economic groups in combination throughout
the nation which felt threatened by the new national economy and sought
to protect their interests through the federal government. Often they were
unsure of the exact means to be used, but they were clear about the end
they hoped to accomplish. The railroads were necessary for the prosperity
of most businessmen, and they intended to force the roads to serve their
purposes. The so-called \'business philosophy" of the late-nineteenth century
meant little to most businessmen, at least when it conflicted with their
practical commercial needs. ttWe are not aware that there is the slightest
principle involved in the question," observed the Banker's Magazine in
discussing the issue of railroad regulation; nit is one purely of selfinterest."82 Such a broad statement might perhaps be harsh, yet it surely described the attitude of American businessmen toward the Interstate Commerce Act.
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